# The fragility of opinion formation in a complex world

Matúš Medo Inselspital/UniBE, Bern

Colloquium, Department of Physics, University of Fribourg 23 February 2022



Reuters

Question #1:

Should we trust Maduro's government?



"Venezuela's government should address the people's legitimate grievances..."

"We must respect the right to peaceful protest..."




"We trust that the government of President Maduro will preserve the constitutional order..." President of Syria Bashar al-Assad expressed his support in a letter to President Maduro,...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactions\_to\_the\_2014-2017\_Venezuelan\_protests

Question #2: What happens if we generalize from this single question to a whole learning process?

#### Opinion formation on a signed network



- Nodes: Subjects on which opinions are to be made
  - Countries and other entities in world politics
- Links: Signed relations between the subjects
- The observer: Outside, no social network

#### Social influence in opinion formation

REVIEWS OF MODERN PHYSICS, VOLUME 81, APRIL-JUNE 2009

#### Statistical physics of social dynamics

Claudio Castellano\*

Santo Fortunato<sup>†</sup>

Vittorio Loreto<sup>‡</sup>

Physics Reports 948 (2022) 1-148



#### Social physics


Marko Jusup<sup>a</sup>, Petter Holme<sup>a</sup>, Kiyoshi Kanazawa<sup>bc</sup>, Misako Takayasu<sup>a</sup>, Ivan Romić<sup>a,d</sup>, Zhen Wang<sup>e</sup>, Sunčana Geček<sup>†</sup>, Tomislav Lipić<sup>a</sup>, Boris Podobnik<sup>h, kl, k</sup>, Lin Wang<sup>†</sup>, Wei Luo<sup>m</sup>, Tin Klanjšček<sup>†</sup>, Jingfang Fan<sup>n,o</sup>, Stefano Boccaletti<sup>10,4</sup>, Matjaž Perc<sup>14,4,4</sup>

#### Social influence in opinion formation

- One example for all: The Deffuant model (2000)
  - 1. Individuals have continuous opinions  $x_i \in [0, 1]$ , initially uniformly random
  - 2. They meet by chance, discuss only if  $|x_i x_j| < \delta$
  - 3. Upon a discussion, their opinions get closer at a convergence rate  $\mu$

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


#### Back to our model: Setting up a synthetic world

- *N* nodes of two types:  $\theta_i \in \{-1, +1\}$ ; unknown to the observer
- N<sub>S</sub> source nodes: The observer knows their types
- Link signs correlate with node types:
  - $\theta_i = \theta_j$ : link is positive with probability  $r \ge 0.5$
  - $\theta_i \neq \theta_j$ : link is negative with probability  $r \ge 0.5$
  - *r* is link reliability


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
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#### Possible applications of the model

1. Two opposing camps: Mainstream media and misinformation sources

- You initially trust in some mainstream media
- Do you end up trusting other mainstream media and distrusting misinformation sources?



#### Possible applications of the model


- 1. Two opposing camps: Mainstream media and misinformation sources
- 2. Employee network: Manager attempts to assess employee qualities
- 3. Inter-firm network: Which other firms to trust
- 4. Social networks: E.g., find a suitable roommate


5. ...

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
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Closely related: Social balance theory (Heider, 1946)







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- 2. Opinion on t is made using its random neighbor




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
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
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


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Shaded area: 10th-90th percentile range

• Introduce the probability that c out of n opinions are correct, P(c; n)

$$P(c;n) = P(c-1;n-1)\frac{c(2r-1) + (1-r)(n+1) - 1}{n-1} + P(c;n-1)\left[r - \frac{c(2r-1)}{n-1}\right]$$

$$P(c = N_{\rm S}; n = N_{\rm S}) = 1$$

 $\parallel$ 


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$$P(c = N_s; n = N_s) = 1$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$E(A)-1/2 \sim N^{-2(1-r)}$$



# Lesson #1

Even at small noise, resulting opinions show low accuracy and high variability

# Lesson #2


As the system size grows, limit opinion accuracy is 1/2 regardless of how small is the noise To make sense of a complex world is difficult

### The majority rule


- Use all neighbors, not just a random one
- Choose the majority opinion signal

#### The majority rule

- Use all neighbors, not just a random one
- Choose the majority opinion signal
- $\cdot$  Opinion accuracy still approaches 1/2 as  $\mathit{N}^{-\gamma}$





#### Random neighbor rule




#### Majority rule

## 1st United Nations General Assembly network





#### Opinion formation on real signed networks



Slashdot social network

#### 1. Bayesian solution:

$$P[\boldsymbol{\theta}|\boldsymbol{\sigma},\boldsymbol{R}] = \frac{P[\boldsymbol{\sigma},\boldsymbol{R}|\boldsymbol{\theta}] \cdot P[\boldsymbol{\theta}]}{P[\boldsymbol{\sigma},\boldsymbol{R}]} = \frac{q^{z_1(\boldsymbol{\theta})}(1-q)^{z_2(\boldsymbol{\theta})}r^{z_3(\boldsymbol{\theta})}(1-r)^{z_4(\boldsymbol{\theta})}}{\sum_{\boldsymbol{\theta}'\in\boldsymbol{\Theta}}q^{z_1(\boldsymbol{\theta}')}(1-q)^{z_2(\boldsymbol{\theta}')}r^{z_3(\boldsymbol{\theta}')}(1-r)^{z_4(\boldsymbol{\theta}')}}$$

- 2. Shortest-path heuristic:
  - · Based on shortest paths between each source node and a target node
  - Information from all paths is aggregated if they were not overlapping

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#### Theorem (Ordering)

For a given network, set of source nodes S and target node t, the expected accuracies of the three rules are be ordered as

 $E[A^{Bayes}] \ge E[A^{ShPath}] \ge E[A^{RNeighbor}].$ 

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Shortest-path accuracy:  $E(A) - 1/2 \sim N^{-\gamma}$  where

$$\gamma = -\ln(2r-1)/\ln z$$

on a random network

How to avoid ending up with random opini<u>ons?</u>

### Option 1: Start with many source nodes

- $\cdot$  More source nodes  $\implies$  better accuracy
- Denoting  $f_S := N_S/N$ , the random neighbor rule gives

$$\lim_{N \to \infty} E(A) = \frac{1}{2} + f_{S}^{2(1-r)}/2$$

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
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- Why group cohesion matters:
  - Cohesive groups perform better and exist longer

• When m = 1, cohesion goes to 1/2 as  $N^{-2(1-r)}$ 

#### Group cohesion: Results

- When m = 1, cohesion goes to 1/2 as  $N^{-2(1-r)}$
- When m = 2, limit cohesion reads




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
$$\lim_{N \to \infty} C(N) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{4r-3}}{2(2r-1)} & \text{if } r > 3/4, \\ \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } r \le 3/4. \end{cases}$$

• For general *m*, the critical point is  $r_c = 1/2 + 1/(2m)$ 




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CORRESPONDENCE Published: 30 September 2021

Increases in COVID-19 are unrelated to levels of vaccination across 68 countries and 2947 counties in the United States

S. V. Subramanian 🖂 & Akhil Kumar

European Journal of Epidemiology 36, 1237–1240 (2021) Cite this article

2.21m Accesses | 10 Citations | 26414 Altmetric | Metrics

A <u>CORRESPONDENCE</u> to this article was published on 24 December 2021

### Instead of acknowledgements









# Thank you for your attention!

M. Medo, M. S. Mariani, L. Lü, The fragility of opinion formation in a complex world, Communications Physics 4, 1 (2021) F. Meng, M. Medo, B. Buechel, Whom to Trust in a Signed Network? Optimal Solution and two Heuristic Rules, preprint (2022) E. M. Fenoaltea, F. Meng, R.-R. Liu, M. Medo, Robustness of cohesion in a model of group formation, preprint (2022)

matus.medo@unifr.ch